We’ll be working on a critique of mainstream approaches to international relations and security. I’ve generated a set of cites for us to work from in order to speed up the generic process and get you all reading relevant articles right away. This set of cites is designed to provide a set of link arguments to a variety of likely affirmative advantage areas. A strength of this generic should be the ability to adjust the 1NC based on the aff selection of advantages. Successful starting points for criticism often center on asking a set of questions often left unanswered/only implicitly answered by a 1AC. For example, many 1ACs will make claims about war and conflict versus stability and peace in describing likely consequences of the plan. Each of these advantages presumes to benefit to vast majority, we ought to ask: -What/who is being secured? What interests are at stake in providing a certain type of stability or security in the international system? Affirmatives this year will alter some aspect of U.S. military presence but often in order to ensure that the larger system of U.S. alliances and a U.S. led global-order remains largely in place (for example through preventing overstretch/improving burden-sharing, arguing that changes in the type of US presence are required for the success of existing strategy, or arguing for a change in US strategy in pursuit of similar foreign policy goals like overall American primacy). -What assumptions about international politics have to be made in order for the 1AC advantage story to make sense? What about our own position, identity, or historical background accounts for our willingness to accept these assumptions? This is a generic sample of a shell for this argument against an affirmative that contains advantage arguments about escalating wars in the Middle East. A. the 1ac is grounded in an orientalist discourse of middle east security defined according to u.s. imperial interests.
Pinar Bilgin, @ Bilkent Univ, ‘4 [International Relations 18.1, “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security,” p. 28]
What I call the ‘Middle East’ perspective is usually associated with the United States and its regional allies. It derives from a ‘western’ conception of security which could be summed up as theunhindered flow of oil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the Arab–Israeli conflict, the prevention of the emergence of any regional hegemon while holding Islamism in check, and the maintenance of ‘friendly’ regimes that are sensitive to these concerns. This was (and still is) a top- down conception of security that privileged the security of states and military stability. It is top-down because threats to security have been defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. In the eyes of British and US defence planners, Communist infiltration and Soviet intervention constituted the greatest threat to security in the ‘Middle East’ during the Cold War. The way to enhance regional security, they argued, was for regional states to enter into alliances with the West. Two security umbrella schemes, the ill-born Middle East Defence Organisation (1951) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. Although there were regional states such as Iraq (until the 1958 coup), Iran (until the 1978–9 revolution) and Turkey that shared this perception of security to a certain extent, many Arab policy-makers begged to differ.22 Traces of this top-down thinking were prevalent in the US approach to security in the ‘Middle East’ during the 1990s. In following a policy of dual containment,23 US policy-makers presented Iran and Iraq as the main threats to regional security largely due to their military capabilities and the revisionist character of their regimes that are not subservient to US interests. However, these top-down perspectives, while revealing certain aspects of regional insecurity, at the same time hinder others. For example the lives of women in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are made insecure not only by the threat caused by their Gulf neighbours’ military capabilities, but also because of the conservative character of their own regimes that restrict women’s rights under the cloak of religious tradition.24 For it is women who suffer disproportionately as a result of militarism and the channelling of valuable resources into defence budgets instead of education and health. Their concerns rarely make it into security analyses. This top-down approach to regional security in the ‘Middle East’ was com- pounded by a conception of security that was directed outwards – that is threats to security were assumed to stem from outside the state whereas inside is viewed as a realm of peace. Although it could be argued – following R.B.J. Walker – that what makes it possible for ‘inside’ to remain peaceful is the presentation of ‘outside’ as a realm of danger,25the practices of Middle Eastern states indicate that this does not always work as prescribed in theory. For many regional policy-makers justify certain domestic security measures by way of presenting the international arena as anarchical and stressing the need to strengthen the state to cope with external threats. While doing this, however, they at the same time cause insecurity for some individuals and social groups at home – the very peoples whose security they purport to maintain. The practices of regional actors that do not match up to the theoretical prescriptions include the Baath regime in Iraq that infringed their own citizens’ rights often for the purposes of state security. Those who dare to challenge their states’ security practices may be marginalized at best, and accused of treachery and imprisoned at worst. B. Orientalist forms of security guarantee genocidal conflicts -- their perspective consolidates the racist hierarchies responsible for global exploitation. Pinar Batur, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Scociology @ Vassar, ‘7 [“The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” in Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 446-7] At the turn of the 20th century, the “Terrible Turk” was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind (VanderLippe 1999). Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” other—Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific “Occidental” Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and global domination for exploitation and absorption. Post-Enlightenment Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the “Terrible Turk” to that of the “Barbaric Russian Bear.” In this context, orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no “race.” It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the “right ideological and cultural framework.” It segued into war and annihilation and genocide and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet “other.” Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior other.” Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates regarding Islam in the West, one raised by the Pope and the other by the President of the United States. Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist attacks on Muslims in Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech in September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, “show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic “holy war,” and said, “violence in the name of religion was contrary to God’s nature and to reason.” He also called for dialogue between cultures and religions (Fisher 2006b). While some Muslims found the Pope’s speech “regrettable,” it also caused a spark of angry protests against the Pope’s “ill informed and bigoted” comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope was ordering a new crusade, for Christian civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, “I’m deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims” (Reuters 2006). In other words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the racialized world, the Pope’s apology came as an effort to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but rather saying that he was sorry that “Muslim” violence had proved his point. Through orientalist and the white racial frame, those who are subject to racial hatred and exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic calendar and is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoicing and celebration. But for Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and, if necessary, of the world” (Lewis 2006). He cautions that “it is far from certain that [the President of Iran] Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events for August 22, but it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.” Lewis argues that Muslims, unlike others, seek self-destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, Muslims in this mindset don’t see the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a constraint but rather as “an inducement” (Lewis 2006). In 1993, Huntington pleaded that “in a world of different civilizations, each . . .will have to learn to coexist with the others” (Huntington 1993:49). Lewis, like Pope Benedict, views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization and claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions such as his actually prove the validity of his position. Lewis’s assertions run parallel with George Bush’s claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, Bush claimed, “This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation” (TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that “the fight against terrorism is the ideological struggle of the 21st century” and he compared it to the 20th century’s fight against fascism, Nazism, and communism. Even though “Islamo-fascist” has for some time been a buzzword for Bill O’Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States it drew reactions worldwide. Muslim Americans found this phrase “contributing to the rising level of hostility to Islam and the American Muslim community” (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to equate “war on terrorism” with “crusade,” this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and reinforces the worldview of a war of civilizations. As Bush said, “ . . .we still aren’t completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in” (CNN 2006). Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the annihilation of the excluded.Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection. Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, genocide is the definitivepoint in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process, that it can conclude only in ultimate domination. Warand genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve the global racist ideology with dizzyingfrequency. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur. c. rejecting their demand for immediate yes/no policy response is the only way to raise critical ethical questions about the discourse and practice of ir in the middle east. Shampa BISWAS Politics @ Whitman ‘7 “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) p. 117-125
The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in Orientalism has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucratsengage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power playon campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds ofethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21 Sample AT: Perm Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4] These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence andimplementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on tei-ror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful politicalconcepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises ofnational and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique. General: Mark Neocleous Critique of Security ‘8 Anthony Burke Beyond Security ‘7 Shampa BISWAS Politics @ Whitman ‘7 “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) Marysia ZALEWSKI Women’s Studies @ Queens (Belfast) ’96 in International Theory: Postivism and Beyond eds. Smith, Booth and Zalewksi p. C.A.S.E. Collective ‘6 [Security Dialogues 37.4, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” Sage Political Science, p. Hegemony: David CAMPBELL Geography @ Durham ET AL ‘7 “Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of current US strategy” Political Geography 26 (4) Softpower Jan Nederveen PIETERSE Sociology @ Illinois (Urbana) ‘7 “Political and Economic Brinkmanship” Review of International Political Economy 14: 3 p. Liam KENNEDY American Studies @ University College (Dublin) AND Scott LUCAS American Studies @ Birmingham ‘5 “Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy” American Quarterly 57.2 Nermeen Shaikh, @ Asia Source, ‘7 [Development 50, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire,” Middle East War Pinar Bilgin, @ Bilkent Univ, ‘4 [International Relations 18.1, “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security,” p. Pinar Biligin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent, ‘4 [Third World Quarterly, “Is the Orientalist Past the Future of Middle East Studies,” Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent (Ankara) ‘2 “Beyond Statism in Security Studies? Human Agency and Security in the Middle East” Review of International Affairs 2 (1) Morten Valbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus, ‘4 [Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict, “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p. Toine van Teffelen, Prof. in Discourse Analysis @ Birzeit Univ, ’95 [The Decolonization of imagination: Culture, Knowledge, and Power, p Democratic Peace Theory Tarak Barkawi, Center for International Studies @ Univ. of Cambridge, Marke Laffey, Lecturer in International Politics @ SOAS, ’99 [European Journal of International Relations 5.4, “The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization,” p. Bruce Buchan ‘2 “Explaining War and Peace: Kant and Liberal IR Theory” Alternatives v. 27 Tim Dunne ‘9 International Relations Prof-Oxford, “Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars,” International Relations, March Stephen ROSOW ‘2K “Globalisation as Democratic Theory” Millennium 29 (1) Brett BOWDEN ‘4 “In the Name of Progress and Peace” Alernatives 29 Failed States: Neil COOPER IR, Peace Studies @ Bradford ‘6 “Chimeric Governance and the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3 Neil COOPER Peace Studies @ Bradford ‘5 “Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces: Representations of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy” Security Dialogue 36 (4) p. Neil COOPER Politics and IR @ Plymouth ‘3 “Liberal Governance, War Economies and the Emerging Control Agenda” Paper for the conference on: Resource Politics and Security in a Global Age University of Sheffield, 26-28 June 2003 http://66.102.1.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:vJX6wlz_vf8J:www.shef.ac.uk/~perc/resourcepol/papers/cooper.pdf+ Pinar Bilgin, @ Bilkent Univ, ‘4 [International Relations 18.1, “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security,” p. 28] Oliver RICHMOND IR @ St. Andrews ‘6 “The Problem of Peace: understanding the ‘liberal peace’” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3 p. Alexandros YANNIS Frmr Political Advisor to the Special Representative of the UN Sec. Gen in Kosovo and Research Associate in the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens ‘2 “State Collapse and its Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction” Development and Change 33 (5) p. Moncef Kartas, Graduate Institute for International Studies Geneva, 2007, Annual Conference of the Nordic International Studies Association "Post-conflict Peace-building – Is the Hegemony of the ‘Good Governance’ Discourse Depoliticising the Local?" Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell Securing Humans in a Dangerous World International Politics, 2006, 43, (1–23) Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ Nottingham ‘4 “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p. Pinar Biligin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent, ‘4 [Third World Quarterly, “Is the Orientalist Past the Future of Middle East Studies,” p. 427 Alex BELLAMY Peace and Conflict Studies @ Queensland AND Paul WILLIAMS Visiting Int’l Affairs @ GW ‘5 “Introduction: Thinking Anew about Peace Operations” in Peace Operations and Global Order p. Morten BOAS Fafo Inst. for Applied Int’l Studies (Oslo) AND Kathleen JENNINGS Fafo Inst. for Applied Int’l Studies (Oslo) ‘7 “Failed States’ and ‘State Failure’: Threats or Opportunities” Globalizations 4:4 Michael PUGH Peace and Conflict Studies @ Bradford ‘5 “The Polictical Economy of Peacebuilding: a critical theory perspective” International Journal of Peace Studies 10 (2) Mustapha Kamal PASHA School of Int’l Service @ American ‘3 “Fractured Worlds: Islam, Identity and International Relations” Global Society 17 (2) p. North Korea David Shim, Phd Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, ‘8 [Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 ISA, Production, Hegemonization and Contestation of Discursive Hegemony: The Case of the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia, www.allacademic.com/meta/p253290_index.html] Alexandra Homolar-Riechmann, @ Peace Research Institute Frankfurt & Kings College, ‘9 [Prepared for delivery at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, “Rebels without a cause: US foreign policy and the concept of rogue states,” p. allacademic] Aff: Michael Williams. The Realist Tradition and the limits of international relations (Intro, Chapters 4 & 5) Jennifer STERLING-FOLKER Poli Sci @ Connecticut (Stamford) AND Rosemary SHINKO IR @ Connecticut (Stamford) ‘5 “Discourses of Power: Traversing the Realist-Postmodern Divide” Millennium 33 (3) Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” Vibeke Schou PEDERSEN Copenhagen ‘3 “In Search of Monsters to Destroy?” International Relations 17 (2) p. James GIBNEY Former Executive Editor of Foreign Policy and Special Asst. to Sec. State ‘6 in Globalization and Conflict p Christian REUS-SMIT IR @ Australian Nat’l ‘4 American Power and World Order Rita Floyd ‘7 University of Warwick, Review of International Studies, Vol 33 p Alex Bellamy and Matt McDonald ‘4 Australian Journal of Political Science 39.2, “'Securing international society: towards an English school discourse of security” Stefano RECCHIA IR Grad Student @ Columbia ‘7 “Restraining Imperial Hubris: The Ethical Bases of Realist International Relations Theory” Constellations 14 (4) Emanuel ADLER IR @ Hebrew Univ (Jerusalem) AND Peter HAAS Poli Sci @ UMass ’92 “ Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program” International Organization 46 (1) International relations--still an American social science? : toward diversity in international thought / edited by Robert M.A. Crawford and Darryl S.L. Jarvis. ’1 (Chapter by Jarvis) Wesley WIDMAIER Poli Sci @ St. Joseph’s ‘4 “Theory as a Factor and the Theorist as an Actor: The "Pragmatist Constructivist" Lessons of John Dewey and John Kenneth Galbraith” International Studies Review p. David OWEN Reader Political Theory @ Southampton ‘2 “Reorienting International Relations” Millennium 31 p. Michael NICHOLSON IR @ Sussex ‘2K “What’s the use of international relations” Review of International Studies 26 p. Friedrich KRATOCHWIL Political Sciences @ European University Inst. ‘7 “Of False Promises and Good Bets: a Plea for a Pragmatic Approach to Theory Building” Journal of International Relations and Development 10 (1) Brent STEELE Poli Sci @ Kansas ‘7 “’Eavesdropping on honored ghosts’: from classical to reflexive realism” Journal of International Relations and Development 10 p. Ken BOOTH E H Carr Professor of the Department of International Politics at Aberystywth University ‘5 Critical Security Studies and World Politics p. 272-276 John G GUNNELL Political Science @ SUNY Albany ’98 Politeia “Speaking politically: politics and the academic intellectual in the United States” Winter 1998 Ronald NIEZEN Anthro @ McGill ‘7 “Postcolonialism and the Utopian Imagination” Israel Affairs 13 (4)
Successful starting points for criticism often center on asking a set of questions often left unanswered/only implicitly answered by a 1AC. For example, many 1ACs will make claims about war and conflict versus stability and peace in describing likely consequences of the plan. Each of these advantages presumes to benefit to vast majority, we ought to ask:
-What/who is being secured? What interests are at stake in providing a certain type of stability or security in the international system? Affirmatives this year will alter some aspect of U.S. military presence but often in order to ensure that the larger system of U.S. alliances and a U.S. led global-order remains largely in place (for example through preventing overstretch/improving burden-sharing, arguing that changes in the type of US presence are required for the success of existing strategy, or arguing for a change in US strategy in pursuit of similar foreign policy goals like overall American primacy).
-What assumptions about international politics have to be made in order for the 1AC advantage story to make sense? What about our own position, identity, or historical background accounts for our willingness to accept these assumptions?
This is a generic sample of a shell for this argument against an affirmative that contains advantage arguments about escalating wars in the Middle East.
A. the 1ac is grounded in an orientalist discourse of middle east security defined according to u.s. imperial interests.
Pinar Bilgin, @ Bilkent Univ, ‘4 [International Relations 18.1, “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security,” p. 28]
What I call the ‘Middle East’ perspective is usually associated with the United States and its regional allies. It derives from a ‘western’ conception of security which could be summed up as the unhindered flow of oil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the Arab–Israeli conflict, the prevention of the emergence of any regional hegemon while holding Islamism in check, and the maintenance of ‘friendly’ regimes that are sensitive to these concerns. This was (and still is) a top- down conception of security that privileged the security of states and military stability. It is top-down because threats to security have been defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. In the eyes of British and US defence planners, Communist infiltration and Soviet intervention constituted the greatest threat to security in the ‘Middle East’ during the Cold War. The way to enhance regional security, they argued, was for regional states to enter into alliances with the West. Two security umbrella schemes, the ill-born Middle East Defence Organisation (1951) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. Although there were regional states such as Iraq (until the 1958 coup), Iran (until the 1978–9 revolution) and Turkey that shared this perception of security to a certain extent, many Arab policy-makers begged to differ.22 Traces of this top-down thinking were prevalent in the US approach to security in the ‘Middle East’ during the 1990s. In following a policy of dual containment,23 US policy-makers presented Iran and Iraq as the main threats to regional security largely due to their military capabilities and the revisionist character of their regimes that are not subservient to US interests. However, these top-down perspectives, while revealing certain aspects of regional insecurity, at the same time hinder others. For example the lives of women in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are made insecure not only by the threat caused by their Gulf neighbours’ military capabilities, but also because of the conservative character of their own regimes that restrict women’s rights under the cloak of religious tradition.24 For it is women who suffer disproportionately as a result of militarism and the channelling of valuable resources into defence budgets instead of education and health. Their concerns rarely make it into security analyses. This top-down approach to regional security in the ‘Middle East’ was com- pounded by a conception of security that was directed outwards – that is threats to security were assumed to stem from outside the state whereas inside is viewed as a realm of peace. Although it could be argued – following R.B.J. Walker – that what makes it possible for ‘inside’ to remain peaceful is the presentation of ‘outside’ as a realm of danger,25the practices of Middle Eastern states indicate that this does not always work as prescribed in theory. For many regional policy-makers justify certain domestic security measures by way of presenting the international arena as anarchical and stressing the need to strengthen the state to cope with external threats. While doing this, however, they at the same time cause insecurity for some individuals and social groups at home – the very peoples whose security they purport to maintain. The practices of regional actors that do not match up to the theoretical prescriptions include the Baath regime in Iraq that infringed their own citizens’ rights often for the purposes of state security. Those who dare to challenge their states’ security practices may be marginalized at best, and accused of treachery and imprisoned at worst.
B. Orientalist forms of security guarantee genocidal conflicts -- their perspective consolidates the racist hierarchies responsible for global exploitation.
Pinar Batur, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Scociology @ Vassar, ‘7 [“The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” in Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 446-7]
At the turn of the 20th century, the “Terrible Turk” was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind (VanderLippe 1999). Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” other—Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific “Occidental” Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and global domination for exploitation and absorption.
Post-Enlightenment Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the “Terrible Turk” to that of the “Barbaric Russian Bear.” In this context, orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no “race.” It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the “right ideological and cultural framework.” It segued into war and annihilation and genocide and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet “other.” Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior other.” Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates regarding Islam in the West, one raised by the Pope and the other by the President of the United States.
Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist attacks on Muslims in Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech in September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, “show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic “holy war,” and said, “violence in the name of religion was contrary to God’s nature and to reason.” He also called for dialogue between cultures and religions (Fisher 2006b). While some Muslims found the Pope’s speech “regrettable,” it also caused a spark of angry protests against the Pope’s “ill informed and bigoted” comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope was ordering a new crusade, for Christian civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, “I’m deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims” (Reuters 2006). In other words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the racialized world, the Pope’s apology came as an effort to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but rather saying that he was sorry that “Muslim” violence had proved his point.
Through orientalist and the white racial frame, those who are subject to racial hatred and exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic calendar and is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoicing and celebration. But for Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and, if necessary, of the world” (Lewis 2006). He cautions that “it is far from certain that [the President of Iran] Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events for August 22, but it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.” Lewis argues that Muslims, unlike others, seek self-destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, Muslims in this mindset don’t see the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a constraint but rather as “an inducement” (Lewis 2006). In 1993, Huntington pleaded that “in a world of different civilizations, each . . .will have to learn to coexist with the others” (Huntington 1993:49). Lewis, like Pope Benedict, views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization and claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions such as his actually prove the validity of his position.
Lewis’s assertions run parallel with George Bush’s claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, Bush claimed, “This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation” (TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that “the fight against terrorism is the ideological struggle of the 21st century” and he compared it to the 20th century’s fight against fascism, Nazism, and communism. Even though “Islamo-fascist” has for some time been a buzzword for Bill O’Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States it drew reactions worldwide. Muslim Americans found this phrase “contributing to the rising level of hostility to Islam and the American Muslim community” (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to equate “war on terrorism” with “crusade,” this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and reinforces the worldview of a war of civilizations. As Bush said, “ . .
.we still aren’t completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in” (CNN 2006).
Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the annihilation of the excluded. Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection. Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, genocide is the definitive point in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process, that it can conclude only in ultimate domination. War and genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve the global racist ideology with dizzying frequency. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.
c. rejecting their demand for immediate yes/no policy response is the only way to raise critical ethical questions about the discourse and practice of ir in the middle east.
Shampa BISWAS Politics @ Whitman ‘7 “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) p. 117-125
The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order.
Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in Orientalism has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power.
Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and carefully.
IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’
to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’
One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13
While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21
Sample AT: Perm
Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4]
These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on tei-ror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1
It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.
General:
Mark Neocleous Critique of Security ‘8
Anthony Burke Beyond Security ‘7
Shampa BISWAS Politics @ Whitman ‘7 “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1)
Marysia ZALEWSKI Women’s Studies @ Queens (Belfast) ’96 in International Theory: Postivism and Beyond eds. Smith, Booth and Zalewksi p.
C.A.S.E. Collective ‘6 [Security Dialogues 37.4, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” Sage Political Science, p.
Hegemony:
David CAMPBELL Geography @ Durham ET AL ‘7 “Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of current US strategy” Political Geography 26 (4)
Softpower
Jan Nederveen PIETERSE Sociology @ Illinois (Urbana) ‘7 “Political and Economic Brinkmanship” Review of International Political Economy 14: 3 p.
Liam KENNEDY American Studies @ University College (Dublin) AND Scott LUCAS American Studies @ Birmingham ‘5 “Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy” American Quarterly 57.2
Nermeen Shaikh, @ Asia Source, ‘7 [Development 50, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire,”
Middle East War
Pinar Bilgin, @ Bilkent Univ, ‘4 [International Relations 18.1, “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security,” p.
Pinar Biligin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent, ‘4 [Third World Quarterly, “Is the Orientalist Past the Future of Middle East Studies,”
Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent (Ankara) ‘2 “Beyond Statism in Security Studies? Human Agency and Security in the Middle East” Review of International Affairs 2 (1)
Morten Valbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus, ‘4 [Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict, “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p.
Toine van Teffelen, Prof. in Discourse Analysis @ Birzeit Univ, ’95 [The Decolonization of imagination: Culture, Knowledge, and Power, p
Democratic Peace Theory
Tarak Barkawi, Center for International Studies @ Univ. of Cambridge, Marke Laffey, Lecturer in International Politics @ SOAS, ’99 [European Journal of International Relations 5.4, “The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization,” p.
Bruce Buchan ‘2 “Explaining War and Peace: Kant and Liberal IR Theory” Alternatives v. 27
Tim Dunne ‘9 International Relations Prof-Oxford, “Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars,” International Relations, March
Stephen ROSOW ‘2K “Globalisation as Democratic Theory” Millennium 29 (1)
Brett BOWDEN ‘4 “In the Name of Progress and Peace” Alernatives 29
Failed States:
Neil COOPER IR, Peace Studies @ Bradford ‘6 “Chimeric Governance and
the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development
6:3
Neil COOPER Peace Studies @ Bradford ‘5 “Picking out the Pieces of the
Liberal Peaces: Representations of Conflict Economies and the
Implications for Policy” Security Dialogue 36 (4) p.
Neil COOPER Politics and IR @ Plymouth ‘3 “Liberal Governance, War
Economies and the Emerging Control Agenda” Paper for the conference
on: Resource Politics and Security in a Global Age University of
Sheffield, 26-28 June 2003
http://66.102.1.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:vJX6wlz_vf8J:www.shef.ac.uk/~perc/resourcepol/papers/cooper.pdf+
Pinar Bilgin, @ Bilkent Univ, ‘4 [International Relations 18.1, “Whose
‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security,” p.
28]
Oliver RICHMOND IR @ St. Andrews ‘6 “The Problem of Peace:
understanding the ‘liberal peace’” Conflict, Security & Development
6:3 p.
Alexandros YANNIS Frmr Political Advisor to the Special Representative
of the UN Sec. Gen in Kosovo and Research Associate in the Hellenic
Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens ‘2
“State Collapse and its Implications for Peace-Building and
Reconstruction” Development and Change 33 (5) p.
Moncef Kartas, Graduate Institute for International Studies Geneva,
2007, Annual Conference of the Nordic International Studies
Association "Post-conflict Peace-building – Is the Hegemony of the
‘Good Governance’ Discourse Depoliticising the Local?"
Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell Securing Humans in a Dangerous
World International Politics, 2006, 43, (1–23)
Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and
Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @
Nottingham ‘4 “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of
Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p.
Pinar Biligin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent, ‘4 [Third World Quarterly, “Is
the Orientalist Past the Future of Middle East Studies,” p. 427
Alex BELLAMY Peace and Conflict Studies @ Queensland AND Paul WILLIAMS
Visiting Int’l Affairs @ GW ‘5 “Introduction: Thinking Anew about
Peace Operations” in Peace Operations and Global Order p.
Morten BOAS Fafo Inst. for Applied Int’l Studies (Oslo) AND Kathleen
JENNINGS Fafo Inst. for Applied Int’l Studies (Oslo) ‘7 “Failed
States’ and ‘State Failure’: Threats or Opportunities” Globalizations
4:4
Michael PUGH Peace and Conflict Studies @ Bradford ‘5 “The Polictical
Economy of Peacebuilding: a critical theory perspective” International
Journal of Peace Studies 10 (2)
Mustapha Kamal PASHA School of Int’l Service @ American ‘3 “Fractured
Worlds: Islam, Identity and International Relations” Global Society 17
(2) p.
North Korea
David Shim, Phd Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, ‘8 [Paper
prepared for presentation at the 2008 ISA, Production, Hegemonization
and Contestation of Discursive Hegemony: The Case of the Six-Party
Talks in Northeast Asia, www.allacademic.com/meta/p253290_index.html]
Alexandra Homolar-Riechmann, @ Peace Research Institute Frankfurt &
Kings College, ‘9 [Prepared for delivery at the 2009 Annual Meeting of
the International Studies Association, “Rebels without a cause: US
foreign policy and the concept of rogue states,” p. allacademic]
Aff:
Michael Williams. The Realist Tradition and the limits of international relations (Intro, Chapters 4 & 5)
Jennifer STERLING-FOLKER Poli Sci @ Connecticut (Stamford) AND Rosemary SHINKO IR @ Connecticut (Stamford) ‘5 “Discourses of Power: Traversing the Realist-Postmodern Divide” Millennium 33 (3)
Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,”
Vibeke Schou PEDERSEN Copenhagen ‘3 “In Search of Monsters to Destroy?” International Relations 17 (2) p.
James GIBNEY Former Executive Editor of Foreign Policy and Special Asst. to Sec. State ‘6 in Globalization and Conflict p
Christian REUS-SMIT IR @ Australian Nat’l ‘4 American Power and World Order
Rita Floyd ‘7 University of Warwick, Review of International Studies, Vol 33 p
Alex Bellamy and Matt McDonald ‘4 Australian Journal of Political Science 39.2, “'Securing international society: towards an English school discourse of security”
Stefano RECCHIA IR Grad Student @ Columbia ‘7 “Restraining Imperial Hubris: The Ethical Bases of Realist International Relations Theory” Constellations 14 (4)
Emanuel ADLER IR @ Hebrew Univ (Jerusalem) AND Peter HAAS Poli Sci @ UMass ’92 “ Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program” International Organization 46 (1)
International relations--still an American social science? : toward diversity in international thought / edited by Robert M.A. Crawford and Darryl S.L. Jarvis. ’1 (Chapter by Jarvis)
Wesley WIDMAIER Poli Sci @ St. Joseph’s ‘4 “Theory as a Factor and the Theorist as an Actor: The "Pragmatist Constructivist" Lessons of John Dewey and John Kenneth Galbraith” International Studies Review p.
David OWEN Reader Political Theory @ Southampton ‘2 “Reorienting International Relations” Millennium 31 p.
Michael NICHOLSON IR @ Sussex ‘2K “What’s the use of international relations” Review of International Studies 26 p.
Friedrich KRATOCHWIL Political Sciences @ European University Inst. ‘7 “Of False Promises and Good Bets: a Plea for a Pragmatic Approach to Theory Building” Journal of International Relations and Development 10 (1)
Brent STEELE Poli Sci @ Kansas ‘7 “’Eavesdropping on honored ghosts’: from classical to reflexive realism” Journal of International Relations and Development 10 p.
Ken BOOTH E H Carr Professor of the Department of International Politics at Aberystywth University ‘5 Critical Security Studies and World Politics p. 272-276
John G GUNNELL Political Science @ SUNY Albany ’98 Politeia “Speaking politically: politics and the academic intellectual in the United States” Winter 1998
Ronald NIEZEN Anthro @ McGill ‘7 “Postcolonialism and the Utopian Imagination” Israel Affairs 13 (4)